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No. 71-227 OT 1971
UNITED STATES v. ALLEGHENY-LUDLUM STEEL CORP.
On Appeal from the USDC for WD Pennsylvania (3-Judge Court) (Aldisert,
USCJ, Marsh, USDJ and Miller, USDJ).
This case involves one of a series of orders of the Interstate Com-

-

merce Commission directed toward the problem of railroad freigl1t car

-

supply and distribution on the nation's railroads.

-

The order under considera-

tion was generally omosed by both shippers and the railroad industry,
represented in the USDC by such organizations as the Association of
American Railroads, the American Iron and steel Institute, the National
Industrial Traffic League, and the National Association of Shippers

2.
Advisory Boards. The USDC permanently enjoined enforcement of the ICC

-

order.

Less than three months later, a three-judge USDC sitting in the

M~JJ..Ie...

lllil8. District of Florida specifically rejected the conclusions of the USDC

for WD Pennsylvania, and held the order to be a reasonable exercise of ICC
power, based upon substantial and sufficient evidence in the record before
the ICC.
FACTS
In 1963 the ICC undertook a study to ascertain the adequacy of the

nation's supply of railroad freight cars. In 1964 the ICC determined that
there existed "a substantial inadequacy" of freight car ownership among
Americas railroads.

A notice of proposed rulemaking was issued,

broadening the inquiry to include all phases of car ownership, utilization,

-

and distribution, with a view toward alleviating the car shortage. A seven
year study ensued, after which the trial examiner concluded that there
not competent evidence upon which to base a conclusion as to the adequacy
of freight car ownership, and that the proposed car service rules (the
subject of the order under review) had not been shown to be justified.
Eighteen months later, in August, 1969, the ICC reached contrary conelusions, finding that the railroads lacked an adeguate supply of freight
cars, and that the mandatory car service rules under consideration were
justified.

3.
J(

1916.

The railroad industry has had a Code of Car Service Rules since
- ;;r -tftePrior to the promulgation~CC order under review, compliance with

the rules was voluntary.

The rules were established to govern relations

of carriers among themselves, particularly, to secure the prompt and
expeditious use of freight cars.
Service Rules 1 and 2 mandatory.

The ICC order made compliance with Car
Car Service Rule 1 provides generally

that cars in possession of a non-owner railroad at a junction with the owner
railroad must be delivered empty to the owner, or loaded at that point to or
via the owner's line.

Car Service Rule 2 deals with cars in possession of

a non-owner railroad at a point other than a junction with the owner railroad.
Such cars generally must be either returned empty to the owner railroad,
or returned empty to the railroad from which the car was received under
load, or loaded to or via the owner's line.

The purpose of these rules is

to assure that empty freight cars in possession of a non-owner railroad will
be returned, with or without a load, in the direction of the owning line.
Prior to the ICC order under review, it seems that these rules
were honored only when convenient for the non-owner railroad in possession.
Between 1956 and 1965, total freight car ownership, as well as aggregate
carrying capacity, of American railroads actually declined.

During the

same period, demand for freight cars increased. These two factors, as
well as others, produced general non-oorrpliance with the Car Service Rules.

4.
The result was that an owner railroad had the use of its own cars on an
average of less than once each month.
THE ICC DECISION
Mter its extensive investigation into all phases of freight car ownership and the rules and practices governing their utilization and distribution,
and the finding that there was "a substantial inadequacy of ownership in
more than one category of freight cars . . . throughout the United states
among all" Class I railroads, the ICC promulgated the mandatory car
service rules as a part of a comprehensive set of rules designed to alleviate
-e -

the frp.ght car shortage.

Since its findings regarding the voluntary observance

of the car service rules indicated that a car owner received the use of its
own cars on an average of less than once each mo th, the ICC concluded
that the operation of the car service rules offered little incentive for railroads to purchase larger fleets of general service freight cars, or to
maintain the cars in good repair, since the principal beneficiaries of such
actions would frequently be other railroads.

The ICC noted that under the

existing system a railroad that owned a sufficient number of cars to
satisfy its own shippers could suffer more serious car shortages than
railroads with deficient ownership of cars. The ICC found that making
observance of the car service rules mandatory would in the long run reduce

; -""

5.
empty car miles, and would place the

improv~ utilization

of cars within
neels

the control of their owners, who could then provide for the --.., of the
shippers for whom the cars were acquired.

Recognizing that the need for

exceptions to the rules might arise, the ICC authorized the railroads to
resolve inequities by negotiation, and authorized ICC officials to provide
exceptions in order to alleviate inequities and hardships.
THE USDC DECISION
The USDC found the order deficient in three respects:
(1) The mandatory car service rules would clearly benefit the

-

owner lines at the expense of the non-owner lines (who had theretofore
enjoyed the use of cars owned by the owner lines as well as their own cars),
and the ICC had failed to find a specific freight car shortage, or more
acute freight car shortage, in the owner lines.

"Owner lines" are railroads

-1-he;,-

that own a sufficient number of cars to satisfy if~ own shippers. '"Nonowner lines" are railroads that are deficient in car ownership.

__,.~ /

Since

there was no specific finding of shortage, or more acute shortage, in the owner
lines, the USDC reasoned that it was impossible to determine whether the
public interest in return of cars to the owner lines outweighed the public
interest in the prompt movement of freight waiting ship :nent at the initial
unloading point of the car. It is undisputed that mandatory observance of

6.
the car service rules would

re'f,v.-ire
1 Jj ·

extra switching and delays at unloading

points, since empty cars under the mandatory rules have to be returned
in the direction of the owner line, rather than merely shipped out in random
directions in order of availability.
(2) While the thrust of the mandatory car service

ru~es,

as well as

the other new rules, will be to require the railroad industry to increase its
fleet of freight cars, the ICC had made no findings regarding the capacity
of the industry to absorb new freight car capital expenditures. Thus, the
USDC reasoned that it was impossible to gauge the effect of the new rules
on the industry, and, because of increased shipping costs which might
result from increased capital expenditures, on the shipping public.
(3) Noting that the ICC had conceded that as a practical matter
there could not be complete observance of the mandatory rules (20%
non-compliance being considered good performance), and considering the
foregoing two points, the USDC concluded that the mandatory rules could
not be considered "reasonable" within the requirement of the statute.
49 U. S. C. § 1( 4)(a).

DISCUSSION
As the opinion of the 3-judge USDC for MD Florida demonstrates,
the reasoning of the USDC is not persuasive .

...

7.
First, faulting the ICC for not making a specific finding of shortage,
or more acute shortage, on the

own~r

lines was not sound, for the ICC

had found that the freight car shortage was all pervasive throughout the
United states.

Given the shortage on all lines, the ICC was simply

establishing a policy that during a period of shortage the owner lines
would have maximum use of the cars in which they had invested.

This

policy is equitable, for the shortage would then bear most heavily on
the railroads which had failed to purchase an adequate car supply.

The

issue wa;}ot whether the owner lines suffered a more acute shortage,
but rather which lines should have first call on cars in times of shortage.
Second, failure to consider the financial effects on the non-owner
lines and the shipping public is not fatal, for the ICC was justified in
designing rules to maximize use of freight cars by their owners during the
period of pervasive shortage.

To deny owners the maximum use of their

cars would in effect penalize the owners, and benefit the non- owners, who
had not adequately provided for their needs.

~

The rules are designed to

serve as an incentive for the non-owner lines, who under the rules will
have to bear the brunt of their failure to maintain adequate car supplies.
Non-owner lines will not be compelled to purchase additional freight cars;
they will simply have to suffer the consequences of their failure to maintain
adequate car supplies.

/

8.
The ICC did consider the financial effect of the new rules
upon shippers, and concluded that any burden on shippers in terms of
"extra switching and short delays" was overbalanced by the "overall
benefit to be derived when originating lines obtain quick return of their
system cars. " Although the ICC apparently did not consider the matter
of additional shipping costs that might result from increased capital
expenditures for additional freight cars, this seems of little consequence
in light of the goal of an adequate rail freight system.
Third, the admission that full compliance with the rules is not
practicable does not render the rules unreasonable. Adequate provision
·~

edsts in the ICC order for flexibility and necessary exceptions to the rules.
1:.

Criminal

sanction~

the SG says, cannot follow absent proof of

criminal intent.
A brief review of the record reveals that the ICC has no effective
way of measuring and evaluating the freight car shortage problem.

Under

the existing system, a shipper faced with a shortage of two cars on April
1 files a shortage report with the ICC indicating a shortage of two cars.
If those two cars are not supplied for one week, the shipper will have filed

7 shortage reports indicating a total shortage of 14 cars, when in fact two
additional cars would have relieved the shortage.

Compounding the

reporting problem is the fact that railroads operate by and large with the

~

/

9.
use of cars owned by other railroads, and therefore have no incentive to
remedy their own shortage problems.
Appellees attack the order primarily on the grounds (1) that it is
unreasonable, and therefore does not meet the statutory requirement of
reasonableness, 49 USC

-

§

1(14)(a), and (2) that it is not supported by adequate

findings, as contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act. Appellees
arguments have considerable merit.

Taking cars away from non-owner

railroads and making them available first to owner railroads in times of
shortage will undoubtedly burden (1) shippers who use the non-owner railroads and have no other choice because of their physical location on the
o..n& (:z.J non-oumev- ra,/ roaJs
lines of non-owner railroads, j who will have to bear' the brunt of their
own failure to maintain adequate car supplies.

But whether these burdens

are "reasonable" and consistent with the public interest can only be determined against the backdrop of the dimensions of the problem, which is
one of massive proportions. It seems to me that the ICC has made a
reasonable choice among a range of unhappy alternatives. At least the
instant choice will help put the general shortage problem in clearer
perspective. It also seems clear that detailed findings regarding the
impact of mandatory car service rules on shippers and non-owner railroads could not reasonablj be made, and that the ICC's general findings
in this area are sufficient to justify its order in light of the broad provision

10.
for exceptions.

The ICC has the expertise concerning, and responsibility

for, broad policy decisions of this character. While the remedy may in
some respects be drastic, so is the problem.
REVERSE.
CEP

1

·

•
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No. 71-227 U.S. v. ALLEGHNEY-LUDLUM STEEL, et al
Argued 3/27/72

Tentative Impressions*
This case involves the validity of an order of the ICC promulgating
mandatory rules with respect to the routing of freight cars.

-----------

A hearing examiner listened to testimony for 50 days, took 6, 000
pages of testimony, filed a 63-page report and concluded:
"The record does nd contain competent evidence upon
which to base a conclusion as to the adequacy of freight
car ownership; and that the adoption of the proposed
car ownership formula, regulations and car service
rules has not been shown to be justified. "
The Commission, 18 months later, refused to accept the findings
of the hearing examiner and ordered the service rules to be observed
for the purpose of increasing - in time - the number of cars.

The

essential thrust of the rules is to expedite the return of cars to the
"owning line", which is supposed to have the effect of making other
lines - which may not own all the cars required for their traffic - to

__ ...., ,..-

purchase such cars.
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read,
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion
at the Conference.

•,

2.
A three-judge court, after recognizing the presumed validity
of an order of the Commission, found that such order did not meet
the special statutory requirement of "reasonableness".
A provision of the applicable Interstate Commerce Act specifies:
"The Commission may, after hearing . . . establish
reasonable rules, regulations and practices with respect
to car service . . . . " 49 U.S. C. § 1(14)(a)
The three-judge court concluded that the rules were not reason-

-

able. It pointed out several deficiencies in the Commission's report:
1. The Commission's report declares that the rules "are not

designed to improve the utilization of freight cars" - but to induce
deficiency owner line to acquire additional cars. Thus, the public
will not be benefitted except perhaps in the long run.
2. There is no factual showing that the rules will cause the
"non-owner lines" to acquire cars or additional cars.
3. The Court found that "the record is devoid of evidence which
reflects the capacity of the railroad industry to absorb new freight car
capital~-. :

4.

T:hoQ

expenditures".

Qslftle

:~;W~i ..ilillfiP@(gt!ltt."'9s;y G.vidence

• ~ • 1 _.
~~~
from shippers that
A

the rules "would seriously obstruct and undermine railroad car
utilization, and that the necessary consequences would be delay,

3.
wasteful railroad operations, and disruption of shippers' production
and distribution program. " See jurisdiction statement 23.
5. The Commission failed "to find a specific freight car
shortage in the owner-lines. "
6.

The Commission conceded that "there cannot be more than

80% enforcement of regulations" although a violation "carries criminal
penalties''.
My Tentative Views:
Although an order of the Commission is presumptively valid,
this presumption is not as strong where the Commission overrules
its own examiner's report. It seems to me that the railroads and
shippers have the better argument, and I am inclined to affirm the
decision below.

Opinion in 71-227

~

v. Allegheny-Ludlam has been

assigned to Bill Rehnquist. When this opinion is circulated I will
probably write a brief dissent. Want to see the opinion first.
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Unless ·you •expect to write a dissent,
Rehnquist of my concurrence.

.· .
'.,

..

..'

·,

.,

'·

~;.

.

'.

.

~uprtme

<;curt of tire 'Pnitdt ~tates
';Wanhinghttt, ;@. <!):. 20?>!-.;t

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

May 30, 1972

Dear Bill:
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Dear Bill:
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CEP

MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL
Re1

No. 71-227, United States y. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.
This is the ICC case involving the promulgation of

mandatory railroad car service rules.

Justice Rehnquist

has circulated an opinion for the Court upholding the
ICC rules and reversing the USDC.

Douglas, Brennan, and

Marshall joined immediately.
The vote at Conference was 7 to 2 to reverse,
and the Chief voted to affirm,

You

You have indicated that

you will probably write a brief dissent,
Attached is the Rehnquist draft, the bench memo that
I wrote in the case, and your tentative impressions,
dictated after Conference.

The Rehnquist opinion reaches

the same conclusions that I reached in the bench memo,
reasoning along the same lines.
CEP

O;

fne (.hJ,r

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
2nd DRAFT

Jus-~- C'

,Tusti co '"'r, ~

Rec1rctllated:

On Appeal from the United
States District Court for thev.
Western District of PennAllegheny-Ludlum Steel
sylvania.
Corporation et aJ.
[May -, 1972]
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In 1969 the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated two "car service rules" which would have the·
general effect of requiring that freight cars, after being
unloaded, be returned in the direction of the lines of
the road owning the car. Several railroa.ds and shippers
instituted two separate suits under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2321,2325 to enjoin enforcement of these rules. In Florida
East Coast Railway Company v. United States, 327
F. Supp. 1076 (MD Fla. 1971), the action of the Com-·
mission was sustained by a three-judge court, but in
the case now before us a similar court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania held the Commission's order·
invalid. 325 F. Supp. 352 (WD Pa. 1971). We noted
probable jurisdiction, 404 U. S. 937, and for the reasons
hereinafter stated we conclude that tho Commission's
action here challenged was within the scope of the authority conferred upon it by Congress and conformed
to procedural requirements.
The country's railroads long ago abandoned tho custom of shifting freight between the cars of connecting roads, and adopted the practice of shipping the·

] 'l.S

r~·,an

~rt

Jvst'!ce Wh'to
Justice H:1.r ,hll
Justice B~r 0 ;~un
Justice Powell -----

From: Pehnquist

United States et al.,
Appellants,

C')

C"

Just-tee
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No. 71-227
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sa.me loaded car over connecting lines to its ultimate
destination. The freight cars of the Nation thus became in essence a single common pool, used by all
roads. This practice necessarily required some arrangements for eventual return of a freight car to the lines
of the road which owned it, and in Hl02 the railroads
through their trade association dealt with this and related problems in a code of car service rules with which
the roads agreed among themselves to comply. The
effect of the Commission's order now under revie"· is
to promulgate t\YO of these rules' as the Commission's
own, with the result that sanctions attach to their violation by the railroads.
Because of critical freight car shortage experienced
during World War I, Congress enacted the Esch Car
Service Act of 1917, which empo,yered the Commission
to establish reasonable rules and practices "·ith rcsprct
"Rule 1. Forri~n c·ar::;, rmpty at a junction with thr homr road,.
must bo:
"(a) Loadrd at that jundion to or via homr rails, or.
"(b) Deli1·errd cmpt,v nt that junction to home road, rxccpt in
instance,; whrre Rule G h;1R b0en inYoked, or unle.-'s otherwise n~reed
by roads im·olwd.
"Rule 2. Foreign cmpt.1· rars other than tho~e cowred in Rule 1
Rhall be:
" (a) Load0d to or Yia ownrr's raik
"(h) Loaded to a dr~lin:-ttion rlo~er to O\\'n!'r's rails than is the·
loading station or drli1·ered empty to a short line or switrh loading
road for surh lo:-tclin~. (Car Selection Chnrt is de~igned to aid in
so srlcrting rars for loading.)
" ( r) Deli1·rred rmpt~· to the home road at :m~· junction subject
to Rule 6.
" (d) Dclil'<'rrd rmpt,v to the road from which original!~· rerci1·ed
under load, at the junction 11·hrre rcrri1·cd, Except that when handled in road haul f<en·ice, C'ar~ of direct connect ion ownership may
not be deliYereJ empty to a roail which docs not hal'c a direct ronnrrtion with the car owner.
" (c) Returned empty to the delinring road whrn handlrd only
in switching service." Jurisdictional Statement 64.
1

·,.

71-227-0PINIOK

UNITED STATES v. ALLEGHENY-LUDLUM STEEL

to car service by railroads. 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a).
The pertinent language of that Act provides:
"Tho Commission may . . . establish reasonable
rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car
service by common carriers by railroad subject to
this part .... "
No party to this proceeding has questioned that the
rules promulgatrcl by the Commission are "rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service," and
therefore the issue before us is whether those rules are
"reasonable" as that term. is used in the Esch Act. The
court below concluded, and the appellees hero contend,
that for a number of reasons the rules in question do
not meet the statutory requirement of reasonableness.
Appellees also contend that the findings of the Commission are insufficient under the Admi11istrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. ~ 551, et seq.
The record of proceedings beforo the Commission
establishes that tho Commission has been increasingly
concerned with recurring shortages of froigh t cars available to serve the Nation's shippers. It found that
shortages of varying duration and severity occur both
as an annual phenomenon at peak loading periods and
also during times of national emergency. Tho result
of these shortages ha.s been that roads were unable to
promptly supply freight cars to shippers who had need
of them.
Underlying these chronic shortages of available freight
cars, the Commission found, 'vas all inadequate supply
of freight cars owned by the Nation's railroads. The
Commission concluded that one of the principal factors
causing this inadequate supply of freight cars "·as the
operation of the national car pool system. In practice this system resulted in freight cars being on lines
other than those of the owning road for long periods

•'
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of time, since the rules providing for the return of
unloaded freight cars in the direction of the lines of
t.he owning road ·were observed more often than not in
the breach. Since the owning road was deprived of
the use of its own freight cars for extended periods of
time, the Commission found, there was very little incentive for it to acquire new freight cars. In addition,
since a road which owned a supply of freight cars inadequate to serve its own on-line shippers could generally,
by hook or by crook, arrange to utilize cars owned by
other roads, the national car pool system significantly
reduced the normal incentive for a railroad to acquire
sufficient equipment to serve its customers. The rules
promulgated by the Commission are intended to make
those railroads whose undersupply of freight cars contributes to the national shortage more directly feel the
pinch resulting from the shortage which they have helped
to cause. By thus requiring each road to face up to
any inadequacies in its ownership of freight cars, the
rules are intended in the long run to correct the nationwide short supply of freight cars which the Commission
has found to exist.
Central to the justification for the Commission's promulgation of these rules is its finding that there was
a nationwide shortage of freight car ownership. The
court below assumed the correctness of that finding,
and we conclude that it was supported by substantial
evidence.
Shortly after the Second World War, the Commission
conducted an investigation into the adequacy of freight
car supply and utilization by the Nation's railroads.
The Commission in that proceeding concluded that there
was "an inadequacy in freight car ownership by rail
carriers as a group." Recognizing that this inadequacy
was caused at least in part by the inability of the rail-
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roads to acquire new equipment, first during an era of
wartime demand and then during an era of post-war
boom, the Commission at that time imposed no obligation on the railroads except to require them to file with
it their rules and regulations with respect to car service.
In 1963 the Commission began this investigation into
the adequacy of car ownership, distribution, and utilization. At the conclusion of the investigatory phase of
the proceeding in 1964, the Commission determined that
there was a shortage of freight cars in general service.
323 I. C. C. 48 (1964). Formal notification of pro-posed rulemaking was then issued, and a questionnaire
was submitted to the various railroads for the purpose·
of compiling data on car ownership and use. After
this data was gathered, railroads, shippers, and other
interested parties were permitted to file verified statements providing further factual material and to adduce·
legal arguments. The Commission, through its Bureau
of Operations, presented to the Hearing Examiner tabular collations of the freight car ownership and use
data, and suggested a formula by which a railroad might
compute the sufficiency of its freight car ownership.
The Bureau also proposed that the entire Code of Car·
Service Rules adopted by the Association of American
Railroads be promulgated by the Commission for mandatory observance.
Many railroads and shippers opposed mandatory en-forcement of the rules. Some roads and shippers appeared in favor of at least some mandatory enforcement of the rules, arguing that unless some compulsion
were used in enforcing them, cars purchased by a railroad for use by its shippers would continue to be detained for inordinately long periods of time by other
roads.

'·'
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After 50 days of hearings, the Trial Examiner issued
his report, recommending against mandatory enforcement of the car service rules. Although the Commission, prior to referring the matter to him, hnd
previously made a definitive finding that a shortage of
freight cars existed, the Examiner's report stated that
there was no competent evidence in the record developed before him upon which such a determination could
be made. The Examiner assigned several reasons for
recommending against mandatory enforcement of the
rules.
The Commission issued a comprehensive opinion disagreeing with the trial examiner in many respects, and
ordering that two of the rar service rules be promulgated
as rules of the Commission with sanctions attaching to
noncompliance. Finding that "the continuing relocation
of cars on owner's lines is of major importance to the
maintE-nance of an adequate car supply," ~ the Commission concluded that the inconvenience in switching and
delays feared by the shippers was outweighed by the
long term benefit "·hich would accrue from the lnandatory enforcement of the t'\'0 car service rules.
AftPr its first order adopting the two rules was is~uecl,
the Commission considered claims that there was nePd
for some procedure for exceptions to the mandatory
enforcement of the rules. A supplemental order then
established another rule which permitted the railroads
to seek cxecption from the Commission's Bureau of Operations, in order to alleviate inequities and hardships. 3
~
3

335 I. C. C. 264 (1969).
"Rule 19-Exerptions

"Excrptions to thC' rulr~ (presrribcd by the Inter~tate Commerce
Commission for mnndntory obsciTanre) for the purpose of further
improving ear suppl:v and utilization, inrrca8ing ayailnbilit~, of
car;; to their ownC'J's, improving the efficiency of rnilrond operations.
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The court below held that the rules \\·ere not "reasonable,'' as that term is used in the Ef:ch Act, for three
reasons. First, although there was a general finding
of a nation\\·ide freight car shortage, the court said
that a specific shortage on o\\·ner lines should have
been found in order to justify the promulgation of these
rules. Second, it said there should have been a finding as to the financial effects upon the railroads a.nd
shippers who " ·oulcl be affected by the rules. Finally,
it supported its conclusion that the rules were not "reasonable" by the fact that even though violation of the
rules could be enforced by monetary penalties, the Commission nonetheless conceded that the obtaining of complete compliance with them would be impossible.
The standard of judicial review for actions of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in general. Western
Che1nical Company v. Un·ited States, 271 U. S. 268
(1926), and for actions taken by the Commission under
the authority of the Esch Act in particular, Assigned
Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564 (1927), is well established by
prior decisions of this Court. \V e do not weigh the
evidence introduced before the Commission; "·e do not
inquire into the wisdom of the regulations "·hich the
Commis ion promulgates, a11cl we inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by which the Commission reaches
its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are
rationally supported. In judicially reviewing these
particular rules promulgated by the Commission, we
must be alert to the differing standard governing review
of the Commission's exercise of its rulemaking authority,
or allcYiating inrquitics or hardships, may br authorized by the director or assistant clirrctor of the Bureau of Operations, Interstate
Commerce Commi~~ion, ·washington, D. C."
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on the one hand, and that governing its adjudicatory
function, on the other:
"In the cases cited, the Commission was determining the relative rights of the several carriers in a
joint rate. It was making a partition; and it performed a function quasi-judicial in its nature. In
the case at bar, the function exercised by the Commission is wholly legislative. Its authority to legislate is limited to establishing a reasonable rule.
But in establishing a rule of general application, it
is not a condition of its validity that there be adduced evidence of its appropriateness in respect
to every railroad to which it will be applicable.
In this connection, the Commission, like other legislators, may reason from the particular to the general." Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 583 (1927).
The findings of the Commission as to a nationwide
shortage of freight cars was based primarily on data
submitted by the railroads themselves covering the years
1955 through 1964. Over this 10-year period total
freight car ownership of Class I railroads dropped 12.4o/o ,
and aggregate carrying capacity of those railroads
dropped 57o . Over the same period revenue tons originated dropped 2.9 %. The decline in ownership of
plain box cars, as opposed to more sophisticated types
of cars, was even more dramatic; ownership of cars
over the 10-year period in question dropped 22.1
while aggregate carrying capacity of such cars dropped
18.9 7o . Testimony of witnesses for the National Industrial Traffic League, the Western Wood Products
Association, the American Ply,vood Association, and the
Vulcan Materials Association also supported the finding
of a car shortage. These statistics, taken together with
the Commission's post-war determination of a car shortage, portray a gradually worsening ratio of carrying
capacity to revenue tons originated.

ro,
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The Commission further found that freight car shortages, in the sense that a particular road was unable to·
promptly supply freight cars to particular shippers who
needed them, have occurred chronically, both during
peak loading seasons each year and during times of
national emergency. It is quite true, as appellees suggest, that inability of the roads to supply cars to shippers at particular times is not conclusive evidence that
there is a national shortage of freight car ownership.
Conceivably, freight car ownership could be adequate,
yet poor utilization of the supply results in shortages.
Nonetheless, the Commission may fairly rely on these
chronic shortages in availability of freight cars as one
factor upon which to base its conclusion that there was
an overall shortage of ownership of freight cars.
The Commission also found that a surprisingly low
percentage of freight cars was actually on the tracks
of the roads owning the cars at any given time, and
that this percentage had been decreasing during the
period in question. In March, 1966, less than 30% of
the railroads' plain box cars were on the line of their
owner, and during the preceding year that percentage
remained mostly in the low thirties. The Commission
summarized the factual situation it found in these words:
"From the evidence adduced and the data collected, it is obvious that an adequate freight car
supply is as much a problem today as it was during
the period considered in our last proceeding in 1947.
Car service which involves a shortage of approximately one out of every ten cars ordered or even
one out of every fifteen cars ordered demands that
every available means be marshalled to eliminate
such deficiencies."
One of the means marshalled by the Commission to
eliminate such deficiencies was the promulgation of the
two rules under attack here. The thrust of these rules
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is to require that freight cars after unloading be dispatched in the direction of the lines of the owning road.
Thus the Commission concluded after investigation
that the railroads were frequently unable to supply
shippers with freight cars. It reasoned from this fact,
and from statistics shm1ing a significantly more rapid
decliue in aggregate carrying capacity than in revenue
tons originated, that an underlying and important cause
of the unavailability of box cars to shippers was that
the Nation's railroads simply did not jointly own a
sufficient number of freight cars to adequately serve
shippers of goods over their lines. Because of the existence of the national pool of freight cars, whereby
roads may service on-line shippers with foreign cars,
it was difficult, if not impossible, to relate inadequate
ownership statistically to any particular road or roads.
The Commission therefore chose to make mandatory
two of the car service rules which would have the
effect of aligning more closely than at present the
ownership of freight cars on the part of the road
with the availability of those freight cars to the owning road for use of its on-line shippers. The result
of these rules, over the long term, the Commission reasoned, would be to bring home to those roads who
themselves had an inadequate supply of cars to serve
their on-line shippers that fact, and alf'o without doubt
to supply incentive to such roads to augment their supply of freight cars in order to adequately serve their
on-line shippers. The natioual supply of freight cars
would thereby be augmented, and the railroads as a
result would be better able to supply the needs of
shippers.
Appellees' fundamental substantive contention is that
the short term consequences of the enforcement of these
rules will so seriously disrupt established industry practices as to outweigh any possible long term benefits in
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service which might accrue from them, and that therefore the rules are not "reasonable" as that term is used
in the Esch Act.' While of course conceding that the
railroads themselves originally promulgated the rules for
voluntary compliance, appellcs argue that because the
rules have been observed largely in the breach, usages
and practices have grown up which permit far more
efficient utilization of the existing fleet of freight cars
than would be permitted if the t"·o rules in question
were enforced by the Commission. Appellees state that
in reliance on the existence of a national pool of freight
cars, and on the consequent availability to shippers of
cars not owned by the line originating the shipment,
manufacturing plants have been located and enlarged.
They claim that enforcement of the rules now would
seriously hamper the movement of freight traffic from
these and other shipping points.
It may be conceded that the immediate effect of the
Commission's order will be to disrupt some established
practices with respect to the handling and routing of
freight cars, and on occasion to cause serious inconvenience to shippers and railroads alike. If the Commission 'vere thrusting these regulations upon an
admittedly smoothly functioning transportation industry, well supplied with necessary rolling stock and adequately serving all shippers, the rationality of its action
might well be open to question.
But such is not the case. The Commission's finding
that there arc recurring periods of significant length
Three separate briefs lun·e bern filed here in support of appellees,
f'nch of which understandnbly presents the rase for affirmance in
slightly differing form, and no one of whirh completely adopts the
reasoning of the District Court. We have not found it necessary in
deciding the case to deal with e~ch separate argument in support
of affinnance, since we belieYe all of them to be genernlly subsumed
under those claims with which we denl.
4
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when there is not an adequate freight car supply to
service shippers is supported by substantial evidence.
While the flexible system of routing freight Cl}fS presently in existence may well have short term advantages
both for some shippers and some roads, the Commission could quite reasonably conclude that it has long
term drawbacks as well. The otherwise adverse effect
on a road's ability to serve shippers which would result
from its owning too few cars is cushioned; the beneficial
effect on a road's ability to serve shippers which would
result from its owning a sufficient supply of cars is dissipated. The Commission undoubtedly felt that rules
designed only to most efficiently utilize the existing
inadequate fleet of freight cars would have little or no·
effect on the nationwide shortage of such cars. Indeed,
the appellees stress the concession by the Commission
that these rules "are not designed to improve the utilization of freight cars, except insofar as return loading is
compatible with the primary objective of increasing
availability of cars to the owner."
But only if we were to hold that Congress, in enacting the Esch Car Service Act, intended that the only
criterion which the Commission might consider in establishing "reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with
respect to car service" was the optimum utilization of
an existing fleet of freight cars, however numerically
inadequate that fleet might be, could this argument be
sustained. Neither the language which Congress used
nor the legislative history of the Act supports such a
narrow reading of its grant of authority to the Commission. On the record before it, the Commission was
justified in deciding that the railroads and the shippers
were afflicted with an economic illness which might
have to get worse before it got better. Existing practices respecting car service tended to destroy any incentive on the part of railroads to acquire new cars, and
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the resulting failure to acquire new equipment contributed to an overall nationwide shortage of freight
cars which prevented the railroad industry from ade-quately serving shippers. Cars service rules which would
tend to restore incentive to the various roads to augment their supply of freight cars, even at the temporary
expense of optimum utilization of the existing fleet of
freight cars, conform under these circumstances to the
:statutory requirement of reasonableness.
Appellees support their claim that the Commission's
promulgation of these rules is not "reasonable" under the·
Esch Act on two grounds not directly related to the rules'
claimed adverse effect on the ability of the roads to
serve shippers. They attack the absence of a Commission finding as to the financial ability of roads inadequately supplied with freight cars to purchase new ones,
and they cite the conceded impossibility of obtaining
complete compliance with the rules as additional evidence of their unreasonableness.
The Commission's order does not require any road to·
purchase any freight cars. It abridges to some extent
the existing practice among railroads of treating the
freight cars which they own as a pool, and for that reason
may ultimately cause roads which do not have an adequate supply of freight cars to serve on-line shippers.
to be less able to serve such shippers than they are now.
If, as a result of this fact, such roads are placed undereconomic and competitive pressure to acquire additional
freight cars, there is certainly no principle of law we know
of which would require the Commission to permit them
to avoid this economic pressure by continuing to borrow
freight cars acquired and owned by other lines.
The Commission, acceding to the arguments of ship-pers and railroads on reheariug, agreed that mandatory
total compliance with the rules promulgated would be
impossible in view of the tremendous number of units

.......:"--;
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involved, and accordingly a procedure by which exceptions might be applied for was established. How the
provision for exceptions will be administered in practice
is a matter about which we could only speculate at
present. It is well established that an agency's authority to proceed in a complex area such as car service
regulation by means of rulrs of general application entails a concomitant authority to provide exemption procedures in order to allow for special circumstances.
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 300 U. S. 747, 784-786
(1968). What bearing any of these factors might have
on an action under the provisions of 49 U. S. C. § 1 (17)
for the collection of penalties for a violation of the rules
in question is a question best decided in such a proceeding. The fact that violation of a rule promulgated under
the Esch Car Service Act may be the basis for a proceeding to collect a penalty does not either expand or contract the statu tory definition of "reasonable" found in
that Act.
What we have said thus far is enough to indicate our
view that there is sufficient relationship bet"·een the
Commission's conclusions and the factual bases in the
record upon which it relied to substantively support this
exercise of its authority under the Esch Act. AppelJees
press on us an additional claim that the Commission
failed to comply with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551, et seq., citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156
(1962) and Secretary of Agriculture v. Uniled Stales, 347
U. S. 645 ( 1954). Burlingto11 Truck Lines is clearly
inapposite, however, since in that case the Court "·as.
dealing ''"ith adjudication, not rulemaking. In criticizing the Commission's action there, the Court said that
"the Administrative Procedure Act \vill not permit us to
accept such adjudicatory practice," 371 U. S. 156, 167.
In Secretary of Agricullure v. United States, supra, the
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Court reviewed the Commission's action, not under the
Administrative Procedure Act, but on the basis of its
prior cases establishing the standard for judicial review of
agency action. Commenting that "in dealing with technical and complex matters like these, the Commission
must necessarily have wide discr~tion in formulating appropriate solutions," the Court "·ent on to conclude that
the Commission "has not adequately explained its departure from prior norms and has not sufficiently spelled out
the legal basis of its decision." 347 U. S., at 652-653.
For the reasons previously stated, we find no such infirmities here.
This Court has held that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to proceedings before the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.
Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173, 192 (1959). Appellees claim that the Commission's procedure here departed from the provisions of 5 U. S. C. §§ 556 and 557
of the Act. Those sections, however, govern a rulemaking proceeding only when 5 U. S. C. § 553 so requires.
The latter section, dealing generally with rulemaking,
makes applicable the provisions of §§ 556 and 557 only
"when rules are required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . . . "
The Esch Act, authorizing the Commission "after hearing, on complaint or upon its own initiative without
complaint, [to] establish reasonable rules, regulations,
and practices with respect to car service . . . . " 49'
U.S. C.§ 1 (14)(a), does not require that such rules
"be made on the record." 5 U. S. C. § 553. That distinction is determinative for this case. "A good deal
of significance lies in the fact that some statutes do expressly require determinations on the record." 2 K.
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 13.08 p. 225·
(1958). Sections 556 and 557 need be applied "only
where the agency statute, in addition to providing a
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hearing, prescribes explicity that it be 'on the record.'"
Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F. 2cl 778, 785
(CADC 1968); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc. v. Dillon,
344 F. 2d 497,500 n. 9 (CADC 1965). Cf. First National
Bank v. First Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 225 F. 2d
33 (CADC 1955). Because the proceedings under review were an exercise of legislative rulemaking power
rather than adjudicatory hearings as in Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U. S. 292
(1937); and because 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a) does not
require a determination "on the record" the provisions
of 5 U. S. C. §§ 556, 557, were inapplicable.
This proceeding therefore, was governed by the provisions of 5 U. S. C. § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring basically that notice of proposed
rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register, that
after notice the agency give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through appropriate submissions, and that after consideration of the
record so made the agency shall incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise geueral statement of their basis and
purpose. 5 The "Findings" and "Conclusions" embodied
in the Commission's report fully comply with these requirements, and nothing more was required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
We conclude that the Commission's action in promulgating these rules was substantively authorized by the
Esch Act and procedurally acceptable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The judgment of the District
Court must therefore be
Reversed.
r. 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a) likewi ~c rC'quires the
conduct a hearing before promulgating rules.
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